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Abstract
The intratemporal redistribution feature of the welfare state makes it an
attractive destination for immigrants, particularly for low-skill immigrants.
George Borjas (1994) reports that foreign-born households in the United
States accounted for 10 percent of households receiving public
assistance in 1990, and for 13 percent of total cash assisitance
distributed, even though they constituted only 8 percent of all households in
the United States. In this chapter we explore the implications of various
redistribution policies for the attitude of the native-born towards migrants.
We analyze the effect of migration on the shape and magnitude of
redistribution policies that are determined in a political economy
equilibrium; at the same time, we address the question whether the level
of migration, when not restricted, is higher or lower in this welfare state
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There is a continuum of individuals. Each individual is characterized by the innate ability
parameter e which is the time cost needed to acquire skill. The c.d.f. of e is given by G(·),so
that G(1) = 1. (The number of individuals is normalized to one). All individuals live for
one period. They are born unskilled, each with a unit of labor time and K units of capital.
By investing e units of labor time in education, an individual becomes skilled which means
that each unit of her remaining labor time (that is, 1−e) is worth one unit of eﬀective labor.
If, however, she does not acquire skill (that is, she remains unskilled) her labor time is worth
only q(< 1) units of eﬀective labor.
The government can only employ an income tax in order to redistribute income.
Many studies (for instance, Mirrlees (1971)) suggest that the best egalitarian income tax
may be approximated by a linear tax which consists of a ﬂat rate (τ) and a lump-sum cash
demogrant (b). Since all families are of similar size and age structure, the uniform demogrant
may capture also free provisions of public services such as health care, education, etc.
In this setup the tax has no eﬀect on the decision to acquire skill. The cutoﬀ ability
level (e∗) between acquiring and not acquiring skill is given by the following equation:
e
∗ =1− q (1)






(1 − τ)w(1 − e)+[ 1+( 1− τ)r]K + b for e 5 e∗
(1 − τ)qw +[ 1+( 1− τ)r]K + b for e = e∗,
(2)
where w is the wage per unit of eﬀective labor, and (1+r) is the gross rental price of capital.
With no loss of generality, it is assumed that capital fully depreciates at the end of the
production process; the income tax (τ) applies to the net rental price of capital (r).
Note that the disposable income (namely, consumption) distribution curve is piece-
wise linear in the ability parameter e. This refers to the native-born population. For in-
dividuals who do not acquire skill (i.e. those with an ability parameter e above the cutoﬀ
parameter e∗), the ability parameter is irrelevant and they have the same income. Naturally,
within the group of individuals who do decide to become skilled (i.e. for e 5 e∗), the more
able is the individual (i.e. the lower is e), then the higher is her disposable income. As can
be seen from (4.2), this relationship is linear. The income distribution curve is depicted in
Figure 1. Note that the slope of the downward sloping segment is −(1 − τ)w. Also, notice
that e∗ is unaﬀected by the income distribution policy (namely, τ and b). We assume that
t h em i g r a n t s( w h o s en u m b e ri sm) are all unskilled and possess no physical capital. Their
disposable income is only (1 − τ)qw + b which is below that of the unskilled native-born
individuals.
We assume a standard (concave, constant-returns-to-scale) production function:
Y = F(K,L), (3)
3where Y is gross output; K is the total stock of capital (recall that each individual possesses
K units of capital and the number of individuals is normalized to one), and L is the supply




(1 − e)dG + q[1 − G(e
∗)] + qm, (4)
The wage rate and the gross rental price of capital are given in a competitive equi-
librium by the marginal productivity conditions:
w = FL(K,L) (5)
and
1+r = FK(K,L). (6)
The income tax parameters τ and b are related to each other by the government
budget constraint:
b(1 + m)=τ(Y − K). (7)
4Note that the base for the ﬂat income tax rate is net domestic product (Y − K),
including labor income of migrants which is subject to the income tax. Also, migrants
qualify to the uniform demogrant b.
Finally, there are no barriers to migration so that m is determined endogeneously by:
(1 − τ)qw + b = w
∗, (8)
where w∗ is the opportunity income of the migrants in the source countries.
This model is employed in the next sections in order to investigate two issues: (i)
How the welfare state attracts migration of various skill levels? (ii) more importantly, what
are the eﬀects of migration on the income distribution among the native-born which in turn
shape their attitude towards migrants?
2 The Attractiveness of the Welfare State to Migrants.
Within this framework we address the ﬁrst issue of whether the welfare state indeed attracts
migrants. More generally, is it true that more taxes and more transfers attract more migrants
in the context of our stylized model? Speciﬁc a l l y ,w es t u d yt h es i g no fdm/dτ.
To simplify the analysis we assume a uniform distribution of the ability parameter e





2 + q(1 + m), (40)
where use is made of (1).
Substituting (3), (40), (5) (6) and (8) into (7) and rearranging terms yields:
½
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2 + q(1 + m)
¸¾














Total diﬀerentiation of the latter equation with respect to τ yields:
£
w




= F − K − (1 + m)qFL. (10)
By substituting (5), (8), F =( 1+r)K +wL (Euler’s equation) and (40) into (10) we
conclude that:









It is straightforward to see from the government budget constraint (namely, equation
(7)) that the tax on labor income paid by an unskilled individual (namely, τqw) must fall





Thus, more taxes and transfers attract more unskilled migrants.
This unambiguous conclusion that the more intensive is the welfare state, the more
attractive it becomes to migrants is restricted naturally to the case of low-skill migration.
If we allow for high-skill migrants as well, we can see in a natural extension of our stylized
model that the welfare state attracts more low-skill migrants but fewer high-skill migrants,
as long as “supply-side economics” does not prevail (that is, as long as raising taxes does
not yield less revenues). This is shown in Appendix 1. As we have seen, migration changes
the income distribution among the native-born and the attitude of the native-born towards
migrants is shaped accordingly.
3 The Attitude of Native-Born Towards Migration
Migration changes the income distribution among the native-born, and the attitude of native-
born towards migrants is shaped accordingly.
73.1 A Benchmark Case: No Redistribution Policies
Let us start with a benchmark case where the government does not engage in redistributing
income. This benchmark case highlights the gains from trade eﬀect of labor mobility. In this
case we set the tax-transfer parameters at zero (i.e., τ = b =0 )a n dd r o po u tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t( 7 ) .
Suppose initially that there is no migration, so that m is set equal to zero and the
migration equilibrium condition (4.8) is dropped out. The resulting income distribution
among the native-born is depicted by the curve ABC in Figure 4.2, which is based on
numerical simulations. Assuming that e is uniformly distributed, the area under the income
distribution curve is equal to net output (i.e., Y −K), less payments to migrants (i.e., w∗m)
which is initially zero.
Now we allow free migration. That is, we reinstate the migration equilibrium condi-
tion (4.8) and reintroduce m as an endogenous variable. The ensuing income distribution
among the native-born is described by the curve DEF in Figure 4.2. As expected, the gains
from trade eﬀect is impeccable in the absence of any costly redistribution: total income of
the native-born (i.e., the area under the income distribution curve) rises as a result of the
inﬂux of migrants.
The determination of the free migration number of immigrants is neatly described in
Figure 3. The aggregate labor supply of the native-born is perfectly inelastic. (Capital is
also ﬁxed.) Thus, the labor supply of migrants changes the total domestic labor supply one-
to-one. The downward-sloping curve describes the marginal product of low-skilled migrants
(namely, qw) as a function of the number of migrants. The equilibrium level of m occurs
8at point A, where qw is euated to w∗. The standard gains from trade (to the native born)
is measured by the triangle-like area ABC, which consists of the total output produced by
the migrants (OCAm), less the amount of wages paid to them (OBAm).
However, the distributional eﬀects of migration are in general not clear: Some must
always gain, but others may lose. In our particular model and for our speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r
values, it so happens that some individuals (those with an ability parameter above ¯ e; see
Figure 2) gain, but other individuals (those with e<¯ e) lose. Nevertheless, with an active
redistribution policy all m a yl o s ea sw es h a l ls e eb e l o w .
3.2 Redistribution Policy
Now, consider a typical welfare state which redistributes income from the rich to the poor.
That is, it levies a positive ﬂat tax (τ > 0) on income (labor and capital) and uses the
proceeds to ﬁnance a positive demogrant (b>0). The immigrants are typically not only
subject to the income tax, but also eligible for the beneﬁts of the welfare state, in contrast
to guest workers.
We perform the following exercise. Suppose ﬁrst that there is no migration. The
closed economy equations described above (that is, (1), (3)-(7)), allow the government one
degree of freedom in designing its redistribution policy (that is, the τ and b parameters).
Thus, for each τ there is a corresponding equilibrium b. Consider a certain conﬁguration
of the equilibrium pair (τ,b). F o rt h i sp a i rw eﬁnd the income distribution curve given by
(2). We then allow free migration, that is, we endogenize m and reinstate the free migration
equilibrium equation (8). We next redesign the tax-transfer pair (τ,b) in such a way so as
9to maintain the income of the native-born unskilled individuals at its pre-migration level;
and ask what happens to the income of the skilled individuals. The above exercise is carried
out for various (pre-migration) tax-transfer conﬁgurations, starting from a very low level of
r e d i s t r i b u t i o nu pt oav e r yh i g hl e v e l .
Notice that in the absence of migration, the redistribution is not distortionary: In
the absence of a pecuniary cost of acquiring education, the redistribution policy aﬀects
neither the individual decision whether to become skilled or remain unskilled (that is, the
determination of e∗), nor the supply of labor and capital. A dollar taxed away from some
individuals ends up entirely, with no deadweight loss whatsoever, at the hands of some
other or the same individuals. With migration, there is still no deadweight loss in the
common use of this term: It is still the case that a dollar taxed away from some individuals
ends up entirely at the hands of some other or the same individuals. But there is a loss
from the point of view of the native-born individuals because the low-skilled migrants are
typically net beneﬁciaries of the welfare state in the sense that their tax payments (namely,
τqwm) fall short of their gross beneﬁts (namely, bm); thus, a dollar of revenues collected
from the native-born does not end up entirely at the hands of the native-born, as a portion
of it “leaks” to the migrants.
Furthermore, note that with a redistribution policy the gains from trade (to the
native-born) may disappear altogether: Total income of the native-born may actually decline
as a result of migration. To see this, refer again to Figure3. The migrants who are low-skilled
and do not own any capital are net beneﬁciaries of the welfare state. That is, τqw < b which
means that their net income (namely, (1 − τ)qw + b), is above their net marginal product
10(namely, qw). Since their net income is equal to their reservation income w∗, it follows that
free migration occurs at a point such as D, where qw < w∗. In this case the net gain to the
native-born is measured by the area ABC, less the triangular-like area AED. This “gain”
from trade could well become negative when τ (and b) are suﬃciently high. When this
happens, it may also be the case that all (skilled and unskilled) native-born individuals lose
from free migration.
Our simulations show (see Table 1) that when the ﬂat tax rate (τ) in the absence of
migration is between 35% to 55% (and the corresponding demogrant (b) is between 17.7%
to 25.7% of GDP), indeed the skilled individuals all strictly lose from migration, if the
redistribution policy is adjusted in order to maintain the disposable income of low-skill
native-born at its pre-migration level. The aggregate gains (losses) to the skilled individuals
are presented in the last column of Table 1. These gains (losses) to the skilled individuals are
also the aggregate gains (losses) to the entire native-born population, as the redistribution
policy is geared at leaving the unskilled individuals intact. Thus, migration cannot be
a Pareto-improving shock for the native-born population, when τ originally (before any
migration takes place) exceeds 35%.
As was already mentioned, when the income distribution policy is geared to main-
taining the income of the native-born unskilled individuals intact, then the net gain (or loss)
to the native-born skilled individuals measures the standard gain (or loss) from trade to
the native-born population. For instance, when pre-migration τ is between 35% to 55%
(and the corresponding b is between 17.7% to 25.7% of GDP), then the curves describing
the disposable income distribution among the native-born look like the curve ABC in Fig-
11ure 4.4. Now, if we allow free migration and adjust the tax-transfer parameters so as to
maintain the disposable income of the native-born unskilled intact, then the new disposable
income distribution curves look like the curve DBC. (Note that among the native-born the
triangle-like area ADB in Figure. 4 measures the total net loss to the native-born and is
therefore equal to the area AED, less the area ABC in Figure 3.)
4 Political-Economy Eﬀects on the Host Country
The preceding section analyzed the attitude of the native-born towards migration. We
examined the eﬀects of migration on the aggregate income of the native-born people and its
distribution among them. The scope of the welfare state itself was not the focus of analysis
as the tax-transfer parameters were assumed exogenous (though, of course, constrained by
the government budget constraint).
In this section we examine how the redistribution policy is determined in a political
economy equilibrium. We then address the following issues in this setup: Does migration
necessarily tilt the political power balance in favor of heavier taxation and more intensive
redistribution? Relatedly, how does migration aﬀect income ineqality among the native-
born?
The extent of taxation and redistribution policy in our analytical framework is deter-
mined by a direct democracy voting. The political economy equilibrium is then determined
by a balance between those who gain and those who lose from a more extensive tax-transfer
policy. The model captures two conﬂicting eﬀects of migration on taxation and redistribu-
tion. On the one hand, the low-skill, low-income migrants who are net beneﬁciaries from
12the tax-transfer system will join forces with the native-born low-income voters in favor of
higher taxes and transfers. On the other hand, redistribution becomes more costly to the
native-born population, as the migrants share some of the beneﬁts at their expense.
5 Redistribution Policy in a Direct Democracy
We continue to employ the basic intratemporal model of an economy with migration and
redistribution which is described in section 1 with two modiﬁcations. As explained in that
section, the tax-transfer policy is not distortionary in the absence of migration. With no
migration, there is also no “leakage” of tax revenues to migrants (through the demogrant)
and, as a result, there need not be an interior solution for the equilibrium tax rate: It may
go all the way either to zero or to 100%. We therefore introduce a positive pecuniary cost
of acquiring skill which is not tax deductible; thus, e∗ is now by:
(1 − τ)w(1 − e
∗) − γ =( 1− τ)wq,
and, by rearranging terms:
e




The second modiﬁcation is done for the sake of simplicity: We consider the case
13where migration is restricted by quotas. Formally, it means that m is exogenously given,
so that equation (8) which speciﬁes the equilibrium level of free migration is dropped out.
It turns out that in this case of exogenous m, one can analytically derive the results when
factor prices are not variable. Thus, for analytical tractability in this chapter we assume a
linear production function:
Y = wL+( 1+r)K, (14)
where the marginal productivity conditions for setting up factor prices (namely, equations
(5)-(6)) were already substituted into the production function. We continue to assume that







2 +( 1− e
∗ + m)q. (15)





For any tax rate τ, and exogenously given migration quota m, equations (13), (15)
and (16) determine e∗,Land b as functions of τ and m : e∗ = e∗(τ,m),L= L(τ,m) and
14b = b(τ,m). The number of migrants (m) is exogenous, but we nevertheless write e∗, L and
b as functions also of m, because we wish to explore in this chapter the eﬀect of m on these
variables. Recall that consumption is a strictly decreasing function of the innate ability
parameter (e) for the native-born skilled; then constant for the native-born unskilled. It is
also constant for the migrants, but at a lower level than for the native-born unskilled since
the migrants do not own any capital. This function is given by:
c(e,τ,m)=

      
      
(1 − τ)w(1 − e) − γ +[ 1+( 1− τ)r]K + b(τ,m) for 0 5 e 5 e∗(τ,m)
(1 − τ)wq +[ 1+( 1− τ)r]K + b(τ,m) for e = e∗(τ,m)
(1 − τ)wq + b(τ,m) for 1 5 e 5 1+m,
(17)
where for ease of exposition we artiﬁcially attribute a parameter e between 1 and 1+m to
the migrants, simply in order to indicate that their consumption is below that of native-born
unskilled. For a given tax rate (τ0), consumption as a function of e is depicted in Figure 5.
by the curve ABCDEF (m is supressed).
The political economy τ is then determined by majority voting. By twice diﬀerenti-





      
      
wf o r 0 ≤ e<e ∗(τ)
0 for e∗(τ) <e<1
0 for 1+m = e>1.
(18)
15Thus, ∂2c/∂e∂τ = 0. Therefore, if ∂c/∂τ > 0 for some eo, then ∂c/∂τ > 0 for all
e ≥ eo. Similarly, if ∂c/∂τ < 0 for some eo, then ∂c/∂τ < 0 for all e ≤ eo. This implies that
if an increase in the income tax rate (τ) beneﬁts a certain individual (because the higher tax
rate can support a higher transfer b), then all individuals who are less able (that is, those
who have a higher innate ability parameter e), including the migrants, must also gain from
this tax increase. Similarly, if an income tax increase hurts a certain individual (because
the increased transfer does not fully compensate her for the tax hike), then it must also hurt
all individuals who are more able (that is, those who have a lower innate ability parameter
e). These considerations imply that the median voter is a pivot in determining the outcome
of majority voting. That is, the political equilibrium tax rate maximizes the consumption
of the median voter.
Denote the innate ability parameter of the median voter by eM. Assuming that
migrants are allowed to vote, then:
eM(m)=( 1+m)/2. (19)
(Recall that the size of the native-born population was normalized to one and the
ability parameter is uniformly distributed.) Diagramatically, suppose that τo in Figure 5
is a political equilibrium tax rate. Suppose further for the sake of concreteness that the
median voter is skilled, that is (1 + m)/2 <e ∗(τo). An increase of ∆τ > 0 in the tax
rate must tilt the income distribution curve from ABCDEF to A0BC0D0E0F 0, so that all
individuals who are more able than the median voter lose and all the rest gain. Similarly, if
16the tax rate is lowered to τo −∆τ, then the income distribution curve tilts from ABCDEF
to A00BC00D00E00F00, so that all individuals who are more able than the median voter gain
and all the rest lose.
As noted, the political equilibrium τ (denoted by τo(m)) maximizes the consumption




Therefore, τo(m) is implicitly deﬁned by:
∂c(eM(m),τ,m)
∂τ




      
      
−w(1 − m)/2 − rK + bτ(τ,m) if 0 <e M(m) <e ∗(τ,m)
−wq − rK + bτ(τ,m) if e∗(τ,m) <e M(m) < 1
−wq + bτ(τ,m) if eM(m) > 1.
(22)
As a second-order condition for maximization we have:
17∂2c(eM(m),τo(m),m)
∂τ2 = Bτ(τo(m),m) 5 0, (23)
where subscripts stand for partial derivatives.
Note that the equation B(m,τ)=0which determines the political equilibrium tax
rate (τo(m)) depends, among other things, on the median income versus the average income.
For instance, consider the case where the median voter is an unskilled native-born person,
that is: e∗(τ,m) <e M(m) < 1. Since equation (16) implies that b is equal to (wL+rK)/(1+





where IM = wq+rK is pre-tax median income (net of depreciation) and ¯ I =( wL+rK)/(1+
m) is pre-tax mean income.
5.1 The Eﬀects of Migration on Redistribution
Having described the political economy equilibrium, we now turn to the question of how this
equilibrium is aﬀected by migration.







Since Bτ 5 0 (see (23), it follows that the direction of the eﬀect of migration (m) on
the equilibrium tax rate (τo) is determined by the sign of Bm(τo(m),m).




      










if e∗ <e M < 1
0 if eM > 1.
(25)
See Appendix 2 for the derivation of the latter equation.
As noted, if the sign of Bm(τo(m),m) is negative, then an increase in the number
of migrants lowers the political equilibrium tax rate (τo) and, consequently, the demogrant
(b). Whether this is what actually happens depends on whether the median voter is skilled
or unskilled. Consider ﬁrst, the case where the median voter is skilled, that is, eM >e ∗.
A sc a nb es e e nf r o me q u a t i o n( 2 5 ) ,t h es i g no fBm is a priori not determined. In this case,
an increase in the number of migrants can either raise or lower the political equilibrium
tax rate and demogrant. Consider next the case where the median voter is a native-born
unskilled individual, that is e∗ <e M < 1. In this case, an increase in the number of migrants
unambiguously lowers the political equilibrium tax rate and demogrant. In the extreme case
19where the median voter is an (unskilled) migrant, an increase in the number of migrants has
no eﬀect on the tax rate and the demogrant.
The rationale for this result is as follows. It is most instructive to begin with the case
where the median voter is a native-born unskilled individual (that is, e∗ <e M < 1). In this
case, the majority of the voters are unskilled and they are certainly pro-tax. This majority
has already pushed upward the tax rate to the limit (constrained by the eﬃciency loss of
taxation). A further increase in the number of migrants who join the pro-tax group does
not change the political power balance which is already dominated by the pro-tax group.
However, the median voter who is a native-born member of this group (and, in fact, all
the unskilled native-born individuals) would now lose from the “last” (marginal) percentage
point of the tax rate because a larger share of the revenues generated by it would “leak”
to the migrants whose number has increased. (Recall that before more migrants arrived,
this median voter was indiﬀerent with respect to the marginal percentage point of the tax
rate.) Therefore, the median voter and all unskilled native-born individuals support now a
lower tax rate. Indeed, Bm which is equal to −rK/(1+m) in this case reﬂects the marginal
increase in tax revenues that are collected from the median voters (but not the migrants who
own no capital) and “leak” to the migrants. This is also why Bm =0in the case in which
the median voter is an unskilled migrant (that is, eM > 1) because the “leakage” element
does not exist. In this case, an increase in the number of migrants does not change the
political equilibrium tax rate and demogrant.
Turn now to the case where the median voter is a native-born skilled individual.
The “leakage” elements, as in the case where the median voter was a native-born unskilled
20individual, works for lowering the tax rate when m increases. However, now an increase in
m tilts the political power balance towards a median-voter who is less able and has a lower
income; she beneﬁts more from a tax hike than the original median voter. Thus, an increase
in m generates two conﬂicting eﬀects on the political equilibrium tax rate. Therefore, one
cannot unambiguously determine the eﬀect of m on τ and b.
Af u r t h e ri n s i g h ti n t ot h e s ec o n ﬂicting eﬀects can be gained when the second eﬀect
(that is, the shift in the political power balance) is elminated by assuming that migrants are
not entitled (or choose not) to vote. In this case (see Appendix 2) one can show that:
Bm(τo(m),m)=

      














if e∗ <e M < 1
0 if eM > 1.
(250)
As noted before, when the median voter is either a native-born unskilled individual
or an unskilled migrant, then even if the migrants were to exercise their voting rights, they
do not eﬀectively tilt the political balance power; and indeed equations (25) and (250) are
identical when eM >e ∗. However, when the median voter is a native-born skilled individual,
it does matter whether the migrants do or do not vote. If they do not vote, then Bm is
unambiguously negative (see Appendix 2 for the proof). When migrants do not vote, the
tilting power-balance eﬀect vanishes and only the “leakage” eﬀect is at play and an increase
in m lowers τ and b.
The eﬀect of m on τ and b has an interesting implication for the income distribution
21among the native-born. Recall that we showed that more migration leads or can lead to
lower taxation and redistribution. For instance, this is always the case when migrants do
not participate in the political process (namely, they do not vote), or when the median voter
is an unskilled native-born individual. Then more migration which leads the native-born to
vote for a lower tax rate and a lower demogrant has the unintended consequence of a greater
inequality of the income distribution among the native-born.
22Appendix 1: The Welfare State and the Skill Mix of Migration
Let us allow for high-skill migrants as well as low-skill migrants. Denote the number
of low-skill migrants and high-skill migrants by m` and mh, respectively. Suppose that their
reservation wages in their home countries are w∗
` and w∗
h, respectively. Then equation (8) is
replaced by two equations, one for each skill type:




(1 − τ)w + b = w
∗
h. (A1.8b)









2 + q + m1, (A1.40)
where m1 ≡ qm` + mh is the labor supply of the migrants in eﬃciency units. The govern-
ment’s budget constraint (namely, equation (7)) becomes now:
23b(1 + m2)=τ(Y − K), (A1.7)
where m2 ≡ m` + mh is the total number of low and high skill migrants. Finally, the other
equations of the model, namely (1), (3), (5) and (6), remain intact.












(1 − τ)(1 − q)
. (A1.2)
































2 + q + m1
¸
. (A1.5)
The latter two equations (namely, (A1.3) and (A1.5)) can be solved for the labor
supply (m1) and the number (m2) o ft h em i g r a n t sa sf u n c t i o n so ft h et a xr a t e(τ). Total
diﬀerentiation of (A1.5) with respect to τ yields:
dm1
dτ
= FL [(1 − τ)FLL]
−1 < 0,
because we assume that the marginal product of labor is diminishing (that is, F is concave).












where dR/dτ = ∂R/∂τ +( ∂R/∂m1)(dm1/dτ). Suppose that “supply-side economics” does
not prevail, that is dR/dτ > 0. ( T h i si sa l w a y st r u ef o rs m a l lτ0s.) Then, dm2/dτ > 0.
Thus, we have established that the labor supply of the migrants (m1) falls while their




















This can happen, if, and only if, dm`/dτ > 0 and dmh/dτ < 0. Thus, more taxes
and transfers attract more low-skill migrants but fewer high-skill migrants.
26Appendix 2: Migrant Vote
In this appendix we prove equation (25) and (250).
Diﬀerentiating equation (22) with respect to m implies that:
Bm(τ,m)=

      
      
w
2
+ bτm(τ,m) if eM <e ∗
bτm(τ,m) if e∗ <e M < 1
bτm(τ,m) if eM > 1.
(A2.1)





















is derived from equation (5.1).





γτ(1 − e∗ − q)
(1 + m)(1 − τ)2. (A2.4)








where use is made of equation (15) in order to obtain ∂L/∂m = q.
Since B(τo(m),m)=0 , we conclude from equation (22) that:
bτ(τo(m),m)=

      
      
w(1 − m)
2
+ rK if eM <e ∗
wq + rK if e∗ <e M < 1
wq if eM > 1.
(A2.6)
Substituting equation (A2.6) into equation (A2.5) yields:
bτm(τo(m),m)=

      













if e∗ <e M < 1
0 if eM > 1.
(A2.7)
Finally, combining equation (A2.7) with equation (A2.1), we conclude that:
28Bm(τo(m),m)=

      










if e∗ <e M < 1
0 if eM > 1.
(A2.8)
This completes the derivation of (25).
Consider now the case where migrants are not entitled (or choose not) to vote. Then
the ability index of the median voter is eM = 1
2, independently of m. In this case, a
straightforward application of the same procedure yields:
Bm(τo(m),m)=

      




2 + q) −
rK
1+m




if e∗ <e M < 1
0 if eM > 1.
(A2.9)
This completes the derivation of (250).
Note also that when eM = 1
2 <e ∗, then q<1
2 (see equation (13)), which implies that
Bm < 0 in this case.
29FOOTNOTES
1 Note from equation (A1.7) that positive b and τ are possible in this case of migration of
both low and high skill migrants only when the wage diﬀerential at the source country (that
is, w∗
h/w∗
`) is lower than the wage diﬀerential at the destination country which is q.
30Table 1. Free Migration and Income Distribution Policy:
Taxes, Transfers and the Gains from Trade
Pre-migration(1) Post-Migration(2) Gains from Trade
τ b/Y τ b/Y m
0.35 0.2434 0.4024 0.1687 0.8748 (0.0646)
0.40 0.2782 0.3921 0.1648 0.8771 (0.0478)
0.45 0.3130 0.3902 0.1628 0.9009 (0.0341)
0.50 0.3478 0.3798 0.1587 0.9062 (0.0167)
0.55 0.3825 0.3737 0.1552 0.9261 (0.0011)
0.60 0.4173 0.3737 0.1539 0.9517 (0.0116)
τ=tax rate
b=demogrant
m=ratio of migrants to native-born individuals
Y=GDP
(1) exogenously given tax rate
(2) endogenous tax rate: tax rate is determined so as to restore post-migration disposable
income of low-skilled individuals to its pre-migration level, for each tax rate shown in
the pre-migration cell. For example, τ =0 .4024 is the endogenously determined tax
rate corresponding to a post-migration disposable income of low skilled, which is equal
to its pre-migration level at a pre-migration tax rate of 0.35.
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Figure 1: The Income Distribution Curve
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  Figure 2: The Effect of Migration on the Income Distribution 
among the Native -Born (With No Income Redistribution Policy)
Notes: The parameter values are: q=0.5; K=1;
 w* =0.95qw where w is the wage rate in the no-tax-transfer,
 no migration case; e is uniformly distributed over [0,1]; the
production function is a Cobb-Douglas                           ,with
                and A=4.5.      
α α − =
1 AK   L) F(K, L
33 . 0 = α






Number of Migrants (m)
The Marginal Product of
Low Skilled Migrants
(qw) 







* = e 1
  Figure 4: The Effect of Migration on the Income Distribution 
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Figure 5: Income Distribution and a Political Economy Equilibrium